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ON ALTERNATIVES IN IMPERATIVES: 
THE CASE OF ROMANIAN VREUN∗ 
 
 
ANAMARIA FĂLĂUȘ 
University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU) 
 
 
1  Introduction 
Epistemic indefinites (henceforth EIs) are existential elements that convey some form of 
ignorance or indifference with respect to the referent of the indefinite. EIs across languages have 
received an increasing amount of attention over the last decade (e.g. Jayez and Tovena 2006, 
Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito 2010, Fălăuș 2010, Giannakidou and Quer 2011, Aloni and 
Port 2011, Chierchia 2011), and although their properties are still a mater of empirical 
investigation, there is one dimension of variation which seems to play a crucial role in their 
behavior. More precisely, EIs have been shown to differ with respect to the extent of variation 
(“freedom of choice”) imposed on the domain of quantification, which can be total or partial: 
 
(1) a. Total Variation (aka Free Choice): ∀x◊φ 
      b. Prendi una carta  qualsiasi! 
          Take    a     card  QUALSIASI       
                ‘Take a card, any card.’ 
 (2) a. Partial Variation (aka Modal Variation): ¬∃xφ 
b. Maria deve aver  sposato un qualche    professore.   
    Maria must have married a   QUALCHE  professor 
    ‘Maria must have married some professor, I don’t know who’  
 
Whereas the EI in (1b) signals that all cards in the context under consideration qualify as equally 
possible options, the EI in (2b) conveys a weaker modal inference: some, but not necessarily all 
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Colloquium, SIGMA seminar, GLOW 34 and LSRL 41, where parts of this material were presented. This research 
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alternatives in the relevant domain are epistemic possibilities. As such, it is compatible with the 
exclusion of some of the possible options. 
 This paper provides further support for the relevance of the distinction between total/partial 
variation by focusing on the Romanian EI vreun, whose distribution has been argued to be 
restricted to epistemic contexts (Fălăuș 2009, 2010). I introduce new facts and show that vreun 
can be used in certain imperatives, a behavior which doesn’t easily fit with its exclusion from 
deontic contexts. To derive this new observation, I extend the alternative-based account proposed 
in Fălăuș (2010) and argue that vreun is an alternative-activating existential which is uniformly 
excluded from total variation contexts. Its use in imperatives will be shown to fall out from its 
conjectured lexical semantics and the way it interacts with (independently established) properties 
of imperatives (drawing on Aloni (2007)).  
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical puzzle under 
investigation. Section 3 is devoted to the proposal in Fălăuș (2010), couched in the alternative-
based framework developed in Chierchia (2011). Section 4 shows how this account can be 
extended to the distribution of vreun in imperatives, once we adopt the distinction in Aloni 
(2007) between choice-offering and alternative-presenting imperatives. Section 5 concludes and 
discusses some open issues. 
 
2  The puzzle: vreun in imperatives 
The distributional property of vreun that is most relevant for our present purposes is its behavior 
in modal contexts. As shown in Fălăuș (2009), the determiner vreun can only be used under a 
(possibility or necessity) modal if the modal receives an epistemic interpretation, a restriction 
that distinguishes vreun from other EIs documented to date. The ungrammaticality of (4), where 
vreun is embedded under a deontic modal illustrates this restriction: 
 
   (3) (The lights in the office are still on)  
Trebuie/ Poate să     fie        vreun   angajat      care lucrează   până  târziu. 
must     / may   SUBJ be.3SG  VREUN  employee  who work.3SG until   late  
‘It must/might be some employee working late.’ 
(4)  *Trebuie/ *Pot să      trimit         vreo      propunere   până   mâine.  
  must         can SUBJ  send.1SG   VREUN   proposal     by      tomorrow  
       ‘I must/can send some proposal by tomorrow.’ 
 
Let us now examine a closely related context, namely imperatives. Farkas (2002), which 
provides the first detailed discussion of the properties of vreun, shows that it is ruled out in 
imperatives: 
 
   (5) a. *Ia            vreun     măr!    b. *Apasă             vreo     tastă! 
      Take.IMP.2SG  VREUN   apple         Press.IMP.2SG VREUN  key 
 
Given the close similarity between imperatives and deontic modal contexts, the ill-formedness of 
these examples is fully expected, and seems to fit rather straightforwardly with the distribution of 
vreun in modal contexts. However, a closer examination of empirical facts reveals that there are 
imperatives which allow vreun:   
 
(6) a. Verifică            pe vreun     site,  poate    e          o greşeală. 
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     Check.IMP.2SG on VREUN   site   maybe   be.3SG a mistake 
      ‘Check on some website, maybe it’s a mistake.’ 
     b. Întreabă        vreun   agent de voiaj  care    e cea mai   bună  alegere pentru concediu. 
    Ask.IMP.2SG VREUN  agent of travel which is the more good choice  for      holiday  
          ‘Ask some travel agent which is the best choice for the holiday.’ 
 
The contrast between (5) and (6) is surprising and calls for an explanation. I should note right 
away that the solution cannot lie in the “strength” of the imperative, i.e. the difference between, 
say, an order and a suggestion. The imperatives in (5) can be construed as orders, suggestions or 
advice, and yet vreun is infelicitous. Moreover, this pattern does not straightforwardly fit with 
the restriction to epistemic contexts. The obvious reason is that imperatives are not epistemic 
modals. To make this point more precise, let us take a brief look at the semantics of imperatives. 
 For concreteness, I will formulate the problem by using the modal analysis of imperatives in 
Schwager (2006).1 On this account, imperatives contain a covert modal operator, which, like any 
other modal, is interpreted with respect to a modal base and an ordering source. More precisely, 
on the basis of the common conversational ground (i.e. what the hearer and speaker both 
consider to be a possible future course of events), the speaker indicates to the hearer a certain 
future state of affairs, with respect to certain rules, desires or goals of (at least one of) the 
participants. More relevant for our present goals is the presuppositional meaning component, 
responsible for the performativity effect associated with imperatives. This consists of the 
following set of conditions which need to be satisfied in the context of utterance:    
 
(7) (i) Authority Condition: the speaker has some authority on the addressee 
(ii) Ordering Source Condition: the ordering source has to be preference-related 
(iii) Ordering Source Affirmation: the speaker considers it to be better that the 
proposition p expressed by the imperative comes out as true  
(iv) Epistemic Uncertainty Condition: the speaker considers both p and non p to be 
possible.  
 
Among these, the “epistemic uncertainty condition” is the one that seems most directly related to 
epistemic contexts. It is meant to capture the infelicity of sequences such as Do it! But I know 
you will not; or I know that you are going to do it (anyway), so do it! Summarizing, the modal 
operator involved in the interpretation of imperatives is closely related to deontic and bouletic 
modals (in virtue of the ordering source), but also includes an epistemic component, which we 
independently know to be crucial for the distribution of vreun. However, these meaning 
components determine the interpretation and the use of any imperative, so we would expect 
vreun to be uniformly accepted or excluded, depending on whether it is sensitive to the 
preference-related or the epistemic component. The contrast between (5) and (6) above shows 
that the situation is more complex, in ways which we have yet to understand.  
 The discussion in this section indicates that vreun is sensitive to fine-grained distinctions 
among imperatives, which we need to unravel. The puzzling distribution of vreun in imperatives 
thus raises two main questions: on the one hand, what is the distinction among imperatives that 
determines the (non-)occurrence of vreun? On the other hand, how do imperatives square with 
the exclusion from non-epistemic contexts? To put it differently, is there a way to uniformly 
                                                 
1
 For detailed discussions of the semantics of imperatives, see e.g. Han (2000), Schwager (2006), Aloni (2007), 
Portner (2007, 2009), Condoravdi and Lauer (2009).  
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characterize, and derive, the distribution of the EI vreun? To provide answers to these questions, 
I extend the proposal in Fălăuș (2010), which essentially argues that vreun is excluded from 
contexts that sustain a total variation inference. After presenting this analysis in section 3, I 
return to the distribution of vreun in imperatives and argue that the imperatives in (5) give rise to 
precisely the strong, total variation inference, which clashes with the lexical semantics of vreun.  
 
3  An alternative-based account of vreun  
The alternative-based analysis of vreun proposed in Fălăuș (2010, 2012) is couched in the 
unitary approach to polarity and free choice phenomena developed in Chierchia (2011). Before 
focusing on vreun, let me briefly introduce the aspect of the alternative-based framework that is 
directly relevant for our current purposes, namely the derivation of modal inferences arising with 
ordinary scalar terms (e.g. disjunction, plain indefinites) and EIs.  
 
3.1  Disjunction and free choice indefinites: a unitary treatment 
Chierchia (2011, 2012) proposes a unitary treatment of free choice effects arising with 
disjunction and free choice indefinites, a term that subsumes both universal-FCIs like English 
any or Italian qualsiasi, and EIs like German irgendein or Italian un qualche. The empirical 
motivation for this unified account lies in the long-standing observation that these elements have 
a similar behavior in modal and downward-entailing contexts (e.g. Horn 1972, Kamp 1973, 
Aloni 2007). More precisely, in modal contexts, both disjunction and free choice indefinites give 
rise to free choice inferences. The examples in (8) illustrate this similarity under possibility 
modals, but facts are parallel under necessity operators:  
 
 (8) a. You may have a cookie or a cupcake.    
          (i) Assertion: ◊ (have a cookie ∨ have a cupcake) 
       (ii) Enriched meaning: ◊ have a cookie ∧ ◊ have a cupcake 
   b. Du darfst irgendeinen   Kuchen essen 
          You may IRGENDEIN      cake      eat  
          (i) Assertion: ◊ (eat cake a ∨ eat cake b ∨ eat cake c) 
       (ii) Enriched meaning: ◊ eat cake a ∧ ◊ eat cake b ∧ ◊ eat cake c 
 
In both cases, an arguably existential element ends up having a conjunctive interpretation, 
whereby any of the relevant alternatives (cookie or cupcake, or whatever relevant cake in the 
context of utterance of (8b)) is a permissible option. 
 To uniformly capture the observed free choice effects2, Chierchia (2012), drawing on insights 
in Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) and Fox (2007), explicitly argues that (a) a unified account of 
free choice disjunction and free choice indefinites is necessary, and that (b) a principled unified 
                                                 
2
 The fact that free choice effects tend to disappear in downward-entailing contexts constitutes an additional point of 
similarity between disjunction and EIs: 
 (1) a. To get the airport, you can’t take the bus or the subway (you can only take a taxi). 
   b. Niemand hat      irgendein       Buch  mitgebracht 
          Noone     had     IRGENDEIN     book   brought along  
          ‘No one has brought along any book’  
The most natural interpretation of (1a) is that both the bus and the subway are disallowed, without any trace of free 
choice enrichment. Similarly, irgendein is interpreted as a plain existential in the scope of negation. 
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treatment is possible, within an alternative-based framework. The proposed account rests on the 
assumption that both disjunction and free choice indefinites (be they universal-FCIs or EIs) are 
alternative-activating elements. The difference lies in the fact that the activation of alternatives is 
optional for disjunction (and other scalar terms), but obligatory for free choice indefinites. Once 
they are active, alternatives need to be factored into meaning. One way to do this (most recently 
defended in Chierchia, Fox and Spector 2011) is through the insertion of an exhaustivity 
operator, a covert counterpart of only, whose role is to eliminate any alternative stronger than the 
assertion:  
 
 (9) [[O]](Alt<<st>t>)(p<st>)(w) = 1 iff  p(w) = 1 ∧ ∀q ∈ Alt(p)[q(w) = 1 → p ⊆ q] 
 
With this “identity thesis” in place, let us briefly go through the derivation of free choice effects 
arising with an EI like irgendein on this alternative-and-exhaustification framework. Consider a 
sentence like the following:  
 
 (10) Du darfst mit    irgendeinem Professor  sprechen. 
        You can   with  IRGENDEIN    professor  speak  
        ‘You can speak with any professor’ 
 
Irgendein is interpreted as an existential that obligatorily activates two kinds of alternatives: (i) 
scalar alternatives (of the form two professors, three professors etc.) and sub-domain alternatives 
(any subdomain of the quantificational restriction D, i.e. subsets of professors), as given in (11). 
Assuming for simplicity a domain with three professors, this can be represented as in (12): 
 
   (11) a. ASSERTION: ◊ ∃x ∈ D[one(x) ∧ professor(x) ∧ speak to(you,x)]  
       b. SCALAR-ALT = {◊ ∃x ∈ D[n(x) ∧ professor(x) ∧ speak to(you, x)]: one < n} 
       c. DOMAIN-ALT = {◊ ∃x ∈ D’[one(x) ∧ professor(x) ∧ speak to(you, x)]: D’ ⊆ D} 
   (12) a.   ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c)     ASSERTION 
       b. ◊ (a ∧ b)  ◊ (a ∧ b)  ◊ (a ∧ b)  SC-ALT 
     ◊ (a ∧ b ∧ c) 
       c.  ◊ (a ∨ b)   ◊ (b ∨ c)   ◊ (a ∨ c)   D-ALT 
             ◊a                         ◊b                       ◊c 
 
As shown in e.g. Fox (2007) for disjunction, the free choice inference triggered by irgendein 
cannot be compositionally derived from exhaustification over the set of alternatives in (12). The 
proposed solution is to allow for so-called “recursive exhaustification”. Simply put, this amounts 
to applying the exhaustification operator to each one of the domain alternatives in (12c). The 
exhaustified domain-alternatives look as in (13), and the exhaustification over this enriched set 
of alternatives leads to the result in (14): 
 
  (13) a. O ◊ (a ∨ b)   O ◊ (b ∨ c)  Ο ◊ (a ∨ c)   Exhaustified D-ALT 
            O ◊ a               O ◊ b                O ◊ c 
      b. O ◊ (a ∨b)= ◊ (a ∨b) ∧ ¬◊ c    O ◊ a = ◊ a ∧ ¬◊ (b ∨c)       …. 
 (14) O
 
◊ (a∨b∨c) = ◊ (a∨b∨c) ∧                  (= Assertion) 
  ¬◊ (a∧b) ∧ ¬◊ (a∧c) ∧ ¬◊ (b∧c) ∧         (= Scalar Inference) 
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   ◊ a ∧ ◊ b ∧ ◊ c      (= Free choice inference3) 
 
This derives the free choice inference triggered by irgendein: you can speak with a professor, 
and each one of the professors in the relevant domain is an option, i.e. the total variation 
inference mentioned in the introduction.  
Summarizing, on this alternative-based approach, the behavior of elements like irgendein is 
fully derivable from the assumption that, like disjunction, they activate subdomain and scalar 
alternatives, the only difference with respect to disjunction residing in the obligatory character of 
this activation. The proposal sketched above, rigorously motivated in Chierchia’s work, provides 
the background for the alternative-based account of vreun in Fălăuș (2010, 2012). 
 
3.2  Vreun as a partial variation item  
 
The main insight in Fălăuș (2010) that I will adopt in this paper is that the Romanian determiner 
vreun imposes a “partial variation only” condition on its context of occurrence. More 
specifically, the alternatives vreun activates, once exhaustified, will clash with any modal 
operator which can be independently established to give rise to a total variation inference.  
  Let us spell out this account in more detail. The alternative-based treatment of vreun rests on 
the two assumptions in (15): 
 
  (15) (a) vreun is an existential element which obligatorily activates two types of alternatives: 
                    (i) scalar alternatives and (ii) minimal subdomain, i.e. singleton alternatives  
     (b) vreun includes among its alternatives the total variation EI un oarecare. 
  
The first assumption is shared with other EIs like algún or un qualche and is due to Alonso-
Ovalle and Menéndez-Benito (2010). The activation of singleton domain alternatives, as opposed 
to just any subdomain of the relevant D, is responsible for partial variation inferences, i.e. the 
fact that vreun is compatible with the exclusion of some alternatives in D. For concreteness, let 
us briefly consider an example: 
 
  (16) Se   poate ca   Maria să      se      căsătorească cu     vreun   doctor. 
      SE    may   that Maria SUBJ  REFL  marry           with  VREUN  doctor 
             ‘Maria might marry some doctor or other.’  
 
The derivation is similar to what we have seen for irgendein in the previous section, the only 
difference being the set of domain alternatives in (17c): 
 
 (17) a. Assertion: ◊ ∃x ∈ D [one(x) ∧ doctor(x) ∧ marry
 
(Maria,x)] = ◊ (a∨b∨c) 
     b. Scalar alternatives  
  ◊ (a∧b)  ◊ (a∧c)   ◊ (b∧c) SC-ALT 
     c. Domain alternatives considered for exhaustification 
          i. Initial      ◊a     ◊b     ◊c 
          ii. Exhaustified    ◊a ∧ ¬◊b ∧ ¬◊c         ◊b ∧ ¬◊a ∧ ¬◊c          ◊c ∧ ¬◊a ∧ ¬◊b 
 (18) O
 
◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c)  =  ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧      (= Assertion) 
                                                 
3
 The free choice inference here is a shorthand for (◊(a∨b)→◊c) ∧ (◊(a∨c)→◊b) ∧ (◊(b∨c)→◊a) ∧ (◊a→◊(b∨c)) ∧ 
(◊b→◊(a∨c)) ∧ (◊c→◊(a∨b)). 
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      ¬◊ (a∧b) ∧ ¬◊ (a∧c) ∧ ¬◊ (b∧c) ∧         (= Scalar Inference) 
           i. ∧ ¬(◊a ∧ ¬◊b ∧ ¬◊c) = ◊a → (◊b ∨ ◊c) 
           ii. ∧ ¬(◊b ∧ ¬◊a ∧ ¬◊c) = ◊b → (◊a ∨ ◊c) 
         iii. ∧ ¬(◊c ∧ ¬◊a ∧ ¬◊b) = ◊c → (◊a ∨ ◊b) 
    (i) + (ii) + (iii) = (◊a∧◊b)∨(◊a∧◊c)∨(◊b∧◊c)    (= Partial Variation inference) 
 
The interpretation we obtain after exhaustification is compatible with the exclusion of some 
alternatives in D: at least two of the alternatives a, b and c are true in some world, but not 
necessarily all of them (partial variation inference). 
  The more restricted distribution of vreun in modal contexts, more concretely its exclusion 
from deontic modals, follows from the item-specific condition in (15b). Without getting into 
details, the hypothesis is that vreun encodes, ‘grammaticizes’ if you like, an implicature that we 
see in languages that have both total variation and partial variation EIs. Italian is one such case: 
 
 (19) Voglio sposare un qualche linguista ma non un linguista qualsiasi.      (Chierchia 2011) 
      ‘I want to marry some linguist or other, but not any old linguist.’  
 
What (19) illustrates is the fact that partial variation EIs can optionally give rise to ‘anti total 
variation’ implicatures. By using un qualche, the speaker can signal that she wouldn’t be happy 
with just any choice, e.g. she wouldn’t marry a phonologist. According to Fălăuș (2010), the 
Romanian EI vreun encodes this implicature, by including the total variation inference usually 
associated with un oarecare among its active alternatives4, as sketched in (20): 
 
 (20) a. (◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c)) = ◊ (a ∨ b ∨ c) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧b) ∧ ¬ ◊ (a∧c) ∧ ¬ ◊(b∧c)  
    ∧ ◊a → (◊b ∨ ◊c) 
           ∧ ◊b → (◊a ∨ ◊c) 
    ∧ ◊c → (◊a ∨ ◊b) 
        ∧ ¬ (◊ a ∧ ◊ b ∧ ◊ c )     
      b. = (◊a ∧ ◊b) ∨ (◊a ∧ ◊c) ∨  (◊b ∧ ◊c)        (= Partial Variation) 
      ∧ ¬(◊a ∧ ◊b ∧ ◊c )                                (= Ban on Total Variation) 
 
The meaning we get after exhaustification is that at least two alternatives are true in some world, 
but no more than two are (they cannot all be true), which tantamounts to obligatory partial 
variation. Some alternative is excluded, although we do not know which one. 
How does this account derive the exclusion from deontic contexts? I present the proposed 
explanation only informally, and refer to Chierchia (2011) and Fălăuș (2012) for details. The 
basic intuition is that the meaning of vreun interacts with operators in its context of occurrence, 
and in particular with modals. It can be independently observed that certain modals, in particular 
deontic and bouletic operators, have an inherent free choice flavor, i.e. when taking an existential 
element in their scope, they give rise to a total variation inference. The simplest way to see that 
deontic modals indeed give rise to total variation is by looking back at the free choice effects 
triggered by disjunction in modal contexts (cf. (8)). If the relevant domain contains two 
                                                 
4
 This is a simplification: what vreun actually includes among its formal alternatives is the total variation EI un 
oarecare and its alternatives <[[un oarecareD]], [[un oarecareD]]ALT>. For a more detailed discussion of this matter, 
the reader is referred to Fălăuș (2012). 
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alternatives, a cookie and a cupcake, we see that once we put these alternatives in the scope of a 
deontic modal, each one of them constitutes a possible way to satisfy the modal claim (i.e. total 
variation inference). The ban on total variation, a conjectured lexical property of vreun, makes it 
incompatible with such modal operators.5  
Even in the absence of a formal implementation of this intuition, the underlying rationale 
should be clear. EIs have their lexical properties, modals have their own. The distribution and 
interpretation of EIs and modals, and more generally of alternative-activating elements, results 
from the interaction of their respective lexical properties. Some EIs can sustain both total and 
partial variation inferences, and as such can freely occur in any modal context. The modal will 
then determine whether the EI acquires a total or a partial variation meaning. Other EIs, like 
vreun, activate alternatives which are going to clash with the lexical semantics of certain modals, 
e.g. deontic modals. I would now like to show that this line of thinking can be fruitfully pursued 
to capture the distribution of vreun in imperatives. 
 
4  Imperatives and modal inferences   
Recall the contrast we are trying to capture: vreun is possible in some imperatives (5), but not 
others (6):   
 
 (5) *Apasă             vreo      tastă! 
            Press.IMP.2SG VREUN  key 
 (6) Verifică             pe vreun   site,  poate    e         o greşeală. 
       Check.IMP.2SG on VREUN   site  maybe   be.3SG a mistake 
        ‘Check on some website, maybe it’s a mistake.’ 
 
Extending the proposal introduced in the previous section, I now argue that vreun is ruled out 
from imperatives that favor a total variation inference, such as the one in (5). Taking once again 
the behavior of disjunction as our guide, I start by introducing the proposal in Aloni (2007), who 
argues that disjunctive imperatives (Do A or B!) can yield a stronger (choice-offering) or a 
weaker (alternative-presenting) free choice effect. Having established that imperatives can 
indeed give rise to different kinds of modal inferences, I present evidence that the presence of 
vreun in imperatives correlates with the weak, partial variation inference: if the context 
(linguistic or extra-linguistic) clearly rules out the total variation inference, vreun can be 
felicitously used. Once again, the observed distribution follows from the interaction between the 
lexical semantics of vreun (its active alternatives) and the semantics of the embedding 
imperative. 
 
4.1  The ambiguity of disjunctive imperatives 
The free choice effect arising with disjunction in modal contexts (8) also surfaces in imperatives, 
as thoroughly discussed in Aloni (2007). Crucially, disjunctive imperatives can give rise to 
different free choice inferences. More precisely, they are argued to be ambiguous between (i) 
choice-offering and (ii) alternative-presenting readings. On the one hand, we find readings of 
                                                 
5
 For details on why epistemic modals do not enforce total variation, despite giving rise to free choice effects, as 
well as a discussion of how the inherent free choice character of deontic and bouletic modals can be implemented, 
see Fălăuş (2012).  
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imperatives where the free choice effect is very similar to the one in (8) above, called choice-
offering readings. A typical example is the following:   
 
(21) MOTHER: Do your homework or help your father in the kitchen!  
  (Son goes to the kitchen.) 
  FATHER: Do your homework!  
   SON: But, Mom told me I could also help you in the kitchen! 
 
The imperative in (21) presents a choice between two equally possible actions; a continuation 
restricting freedom of choice sounds inappropriate and can therefore be objected to. The key 
property of choice-offering imperatives, according to Aloni, is the entailment that the addressee 
is both allowed to do A and to do B. Assuming that imperatives denote compliance conditions 
(which for simplicity can be treated as propositional alternatives), (22a) introduces the set 
containing the two propositions in (22b), both expressing a possible way of complying with the 
command expressed by the imperative: 
 
 (22) a. Post this letter or burn it!  
 b. {that the addressee posts the letter, that the addressee burns the letter} 
 c. You must post this letter or burn it.  
 d. You may post this letter and you may burn it. 
 
On Aloni’s account, the imperative entails that the hearer must do A or B, which in turn entails 
(22d), yielding the usual free choice effect. An interesting consequence of treating free choice as 
an entailment is the incompatibility of imperatives on their choice-offering reading with 
continuations like ‘don’t do B!’: 
 
(23) Post this letter or burn it! #Don’t you dare burn this letter! 
 
In other words, each one of the alternatives activated in the context qualifies as a possible course 
of action, and none of them can be (felicitously) excluded.  
 In addition to choice-offering readings, disjunctive imperatives can give rise to a weaker, less 
frequent interpretation, called alternative-presenting (Aquist 1965). The following example (due 
to Rescher and Robison 1964) illustrates this reading: 
 
(24) TEACHER: John, stop that foolishness or leave the room!  
  (John gets up and starts to leave.) 
   TEACHER: Don’t you dare leave this room! 
 
Here, the second order is perceived as a clarification with respect to the first, and is meant to 
show that the first imperative should not be understood as offering a choice between two equally 
possible actions. In other words, on its alternative-presenting reading, a disjunctive imperative 
does not entail that the addressee is both allowed to do A and to do B. More precisely, (24) is 
interpreted as the singleton set consisting of the disjunctive proposition ‘that the addressee does 
A or B’ (rather than a set containing two propositions, as in (22b) above). Crucially then, in the 
absence of free choice entailment, the imperative is compatible with continuations overtly 
excluding one of the alternatives. Alternative-presenting readings are less frequent, a state-of-
affairs which Aloni attributes to a general pragmatic preference for stronger interpretations. 
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This suffices to establish the main empirical point relevant for our purposes: when they take 
existentials in their scope, imperatives can yield different modal inferences. Assuming this 
distinction between the readings of disjunctive imperatives, I would now like to recast this 
ambiguity in terms of total/partial variation. More precisely, we can assimilate choice-offering 
imperatives to total variation contexts: all relevant alternatives qualify as possible options 
(which here represent possible courses of action). On their alternative-presenting interpretation, 
disjunctive imperatives qualify as partial variation contexts, where some, but not necessarily all 
relevant alternatives are possible courses of action. The next section argues that this 
reformulation provides a solution for the puzzling distribution of vreun in imperatives.  
   
4.2  Vreun in imperatives 
The discussion so far has introduced all the elements we need to account for the contrast between 
the imperatives in (5) and (6) above. First, recall from section 3 above that vreun is ruled out in 
contexts that prompt a total variation inference. Second, as detailed in the previous section, we 
know that alternative-presenting interpretations of imperatives yield a weak kind of free choice 
inference, i.e. partial variation. Putting everything together, we expect vreun to be excluded from 
choice-offering imperatives, but perfectly acceptable in alternative-presenting ones, for these are 
the only cases which qualify as partial variation contexts. The remainder of this paper provides 
evidence in favor of this hypothesis.  
 To show that this is indeed the relevant factor, let us take a closer look at the examples we 
are trying to account for: 
  
 (25) *Alege             vreo     carte! 
             Pick.IMP.2SG  VREUN  card 
 (26) Vorbeşte        cu     vreun    vecin,      să      ia          coletul   în lipsa       ta.  
     Talk.IMP.2SG with  VREUN  neighbor SUBJ  take.3SG parcel     in  absence  yours 
    ‘Talk to some neighbor, so that he picks up the parcel in your absence. 
 
Imperatives with existential elements, such as the ones in (25)-(26), are potentially ambiguous 
between the two readings described above. The difference between the two is a highly context-
dependent matter. The challenge is to understand what allows the interpretation of (26), but not 
(25), as an alternative-presenting imperative, i.e. a partial variation context.  
 In the absence of any contextual indication to the contrary, scenarios where one would use 
(5) or (25) are most likely scenarios where all relevant alternatives (the keyboard or the set of 
cards at play) would be taken as possible values for the indefinite phrase. If the speaker says 
nothing more than Pick a card! or Press a key!, the addressee feels entitled to choose freely any 
one of the keys or cards in front of him. This is precisely the type of context that is incompatible 
with vreun. To satisfy the obligatory partial variation, the meaning we obtain after exhaustifying 
the alternatives activated by vreun (as in (20) above), it is crucial that not all elements in the 
quantificational domain count as possible options. To put it differently, the speaker must be able 
to exclude some epistemic possibilities, although he doesn’t necessarily know which ones. In 
contrast to (25), the imperative in (26) is easily compatible with a partial variation scenario. For 
example, imagine a context where A is expecting an important delivery, but will be away for the 
next couple of days. In this set up, B could easily utter (26) even if he knows that one of A’s 
neighbors is never willing to help, and so wouldn’t be a possible choice. Or without knowing 
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anything at all about A’s neighbors. What matters is that there be a way to establish a partial 
variation scenario, something which can be easier to do in some contexts than others.   
I think that this line of reasoning can be fruitfully pursued to capture the behavior of vreun 
without any construction-specific assumptions. Just like everywhere else, the distribution of 
vreun is wholly derivable from the interaction between the alternatives it activates and semantic 
properties of the operators in the context. The immediate problem raised by this explanation 
comes from the difference between modals and imperatives. More specifically, as mentioned 
above, the fact that certain modal operators (i.e. deontic and bouletic) induce a total variation 
inference for an existential element in their scope is assumed to be a lexical, inherent property of 
the modal in question. Imperatives cannot be claimed to have such an ‘inherent free choice’ 
meaning, although they can easily favor such inferences, as we have just seen. The various 
readings of imperatives with existentials are highly context-sensitive and quite difficult to tear 
apart. Accordingly, if we want to maintain that this is a real distinction among imperatives, and 
thus substantiate the claim that it plays a crucial part in the use of vreun, we need independent 
ways to identify the weak(er) modal inference arising in imperatives. In the absence of it, our 
explanation runs the risk of circularity: if vreun occurs in an imperative, then it is an alternative-
presenting imperative; and if it is an alternative-presenting imperative, then vreun is ruled in.   
 One possible solution comes from the consideration of anti-exhaustifiers like zum Beispiel 
‘for example’ (Schwager 2005): 
 
 (27) How could I save money? 
        Kauf         zum   Beispiel  keine    Zigaretten!  
        buy.IMP      for     example no         cigarettes  
        ‘For example, don’t buy any cigarettes.’ 
 
The imperative in (27) can be interpreted as expressing that buying cigarettes is an inexhaustive 
possibility (i.e., one possibility among others), which could be paraphrased as One of the things 
you could do is not buy cigarettes. Setting aside the mechanism which underlies the contribution 
of an anti-exhaustifier, I introduce an arguably equivalent construction in Romanian imperatives.  
 The Romanian counterpart of zum Beispiel, namely de exemplu, sounds quite strange in 
imperatives. Instead, Romanian resorts to a different strategy to express inexhaustive possibility: 
the insertion of an overt subject modified by the particle şi ‘and, also’, a construction I mark as 
ADD+SUBJ:6 
 
 (28) A: What should I do to make Mary feel better? 
    B: Du-o                     şi      tu           la un film! 
                  Take.IMP.2SG-her ADD  you(SG)   at a    movie  
              ‘(I don’t know, one thing you could do is) Take her to a movie!’ 
 
The presence of an overt subject in an imperative is normally disallowed in Romanian (unless it 
is a stressed, contrastive subject, in sentences like YOU solve this problem (not me)!). I am not 
aware of any previous observation concerning the ADD+SUBJ construction, whose analysis lies 
                                                 
6
 In all examples with ADD+SUBJ considered here, it is important to distinguish the reading under discussion (which 
brings about the weaker interpretation of the imperative) from a truly additive reading: ‘You get out of the room, just 
like someone else did’. The two readings associate with very different intonational patterns and are used in different 
contexts, but the details of this distinction are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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beyond the scope of this paper. But there is compelling evidence that it functions as an anti-
exhaustifier, namely it brings about a weak (in our terms partial variation) interpretation of the 
imperative, indicating one possible course of action among others. There are three empirical 
facts corroborating my claim. First, the insertion of ADD+SUBJ is not possible in imperatives 
interpreted as orders: 
 
  (29) Ieşi                    (*şi      tu)         din cameră! 
    Get out. IMP.2SG   ADD  you(SG)  of  room 
     ‘Get out of the room!’ 
 
A second, related fact is the ungrammaticality of ADD+SUBJ in imperatives which are explicitly 
marked as indicating only one possible course of action:   
 
 (30) We are organizing a conference, but received very few abstracts. We are wondering     
    what to do and a colleague says: 
    Nu văd        decât o     soluţie    / Nu  aveţi        de ales: 
     not see.1SG  only  one solution    not  have.2PL to  choose  
      extindeţi           (*şi   voi)           deadine-ul! 
      extend.IMP.2PL   ADD you(PL)    deadline-the    
      ‘I see only one solution/You have no choice: extend the deadline.’ 
 
Finally, the insertion of ADD+SUBJ is not possible in imperatives that contain a free choice item 
(typically licensed in choice-offering imperatives, cf. Aloni 2007): 
 
 (31) Alege            (*şi      tu)        orice carte! 
    Pick.IMP.2SG    ADD  you(SG) any   card 
         ‘Pick any card!’ 
 
Taken together, these facts indicate that ADD+SUBJ patterns with imperatives indicating one 
possible course of action among others, i.e. functions as an anti-exhaustifier. If the context 
clearly rules out this reading of the imperative, ADD+SUBJ cannot be used. This correlation 
carries over to imperatives with existential elements, as in (32): 
 
 (32) Vorbeşte          (şi      tu)        cu      Paul sau Maria. 
         Talk.IMP.2SG     ADD  you(SG) with  Paul or    Maria 
  
As we have seen before, disjunctive imperatives are ambiguous. ADD+SUBJ can be optionally 
inserted, but when present, the imperative cannot convey a choice between two equally possible 
courses of action (i.e. talk to Paul and talk to Maria). It simply means that the addressee could 
talk to Paul or Maria, among other things. In other words, once the imperative embeds an 
existential element, the presence of ADD+SUBJ patterns with the weaker, partial variation 
inference. 
 If the hypothesis proposed above is on the right track, we predict vreun to always be possible 
in imperatives that allow for ADD+SUBJ. This prediction seems to be borne out: all imperatives 
where vreun occurs allow the insertion of ADD+SUBJ: 
 
 (32) Verifică            şi      tu         pe vreun    site! 
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         Check.IMP.2SG ADD you(SG) on VREUN   site   
    ‘Check on some website!’ 
 
As mentioned above, I am not aiming to offer an account of why ADD+SUBJ functions as an anti-
exhaustifier. I am simply introducing these facts as an arguably independent, albeit preliminary, 
test to identify weaker readings of imperatives and support the correlation with the distribution of 
vreun. More empirical investigation is necessary before reaching firm conclusions on this 
correlation, and understanding the exact contribution of each element involved: imperative, 
vreun and possibly constructions like ADD+SUBJ. But the main point should be clear: the 
explanation for the behavior of vreun in imperatives should be sought in the semantics of 
imperatives, and the arising modal inferences. More generally, I take the facts discussed in this 
paper to indicate the need for more refined generalizations on the interaction between 
imperatives and various kinds of indefinites.7  
 
5  Concluding remarks  
Let me summarize the main points emerging from our discussion. The starting point was the fact 
that EIs cross-linguistically are known to sustain modal inferences of a stronger (total variation) 
or a weaker (partial variation) type. The Romanian determiner vreun has been previously argued 
to only allow partial variation. Focusing on a new context of occurrence of vreun, namely 
imperatives, we have seen that they do not easily pattern with the other contexts where the 
Romanian EI is used. I have argued that a more coherent picture can be drawn once we (i) pursue 
an alternative-based approach to EIs and (ii) pay closer attention to the modal inferences arising 
in imperatives. Once we adopt the hypothesis that the alternatives activated by vreun are 
incompatible with operators that give rise to total variation inferences, the distribution of vreun 
in imperatives falls into place without any construction-specific assumptions.  
An important issue that remains to be explored concerns the factors responsible for satisfying 
the partial variation condition imposed by vreun (e.g. lexical properties of the embedding 
operator, the role of anti-exhaustifiers). Future research needs to probe further into the source of 
the observed inferences (modal, EI or the interaction of the two), and test the predictions made 
by the alternative-based approach I am pursuing. But I take the data introduced in this paper to 
provide an interesting argument for the relevance of total/partial variation to a proper 
understanding of vreun, and more generally to the typology of EIs.  
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